In recent years, Chinese companies seeking to expand their global footprint have increasingly found themselves hitting brick walls of resistance across multiple continents.
From European democracies to African nations, governments are erecting barriers against Beijing’s economic ambitions, citing national security concerns, exploitative practices, and geopolitical risks.
This growing pushback signals a profound shift in how the world views Chinese business interests and raises serious questions about China’s ability to maintain its trajectory of global economic influence.
The Czech Republic’s recent decision to block Beijing-based Emposat from operating a satellite ground station in South Moravia exemplifies the mounting security anxieties surrounding Chinese investments.1
Despite the seemingly innocuous nature of a satellite dish installation, Czech intelligence agencies flagged significant security implications, leading the government to invoke its most stringent foreign investment screening measures.
This unprecedented move marks the first application of the Czech Republic’s 2021 law designed to protect sensitive sectors from high-risk foreign investments.
According to documents leaked from the government’s classified session, the Emposat facility “may pose a threat to the security of the Czech Republic or to internal or public order.”
The Czech counterintelligence agency BIS explicitly warned that the 7.3-meter parabolic antenna could potentially be used for espionage purposes.
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As Ministry spokesperson Marek Vošahlík bluntly stated, “The investment has minimal impact on employment and the economy, but due to the nature of the facility, it may have significant security implications.”2 This incident is far from isolated. Across Europe and North America, Chinese telecommunications companies have faced increasing scrutiny and outright bans.
The suspicion that technological infrastructure could serve as backdoors for Beijing’s intelligence gathering has severely limited Chinese tech companies’ ability to penetrate Western markets.
In the resource-rich nations of Africa, Chinese companies are confronting a growing tide of resource nationalism.
Niger’s military junta recently expelled three senior Chinese executives from oil companies operating in the country, including representatives from China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and Societe de Raffinage de Zinder (SORAZ).3
The government also revoked the operating license of the Chinese-owned Soluxe International Hotel in Niamey. The junta accused these companies of failing to comply with a 2024 amendment to Niger’s mining code that requires prioritization of local labor, goods, and services.
Significant wage disparities between Chinese expatriates and local employees have fueled perceptions of exploitation, while financial data management in Mandarin has raised red flags about transparency and potential profit extraction
Niger’s actions reflect a broader intention to diminish foreign influence in the country. The military government has frozen SORAZ’s bank accounts and redirected fuel imports from Nigeria rather than utilizing Chinese-operated infrastructure.
This direct challenge puts CNPC’s substantial investments at risk, including its 60% stake in SORAZ and its involvement in the Niger-Benin pipeline.
Similar trends are emerging elsewhere on the continent. In Zambia, an acid spill at a Chinese-owned mine operated by Sino-Metals Leach contaminated the Kafue River, forcing authorities to shut down water supply to the city of Kitwe.4
Such environmental disasters only reinforce negative perceptions of Chinese business practices in Africa and strengthen calls for greater oversight of their operations.
Perhaps nowhere is anti-China sentiment more pronounced than in Myanmar, where social media has become a hotbed of hostility toward Chinese interests.
A recent study conducted by Chinese social media platform Toutiao and analysis company Insecurity Insight revealed deeply troubling patterns of hate speech targeting China and Chinese people in Myanmar between July 2024 and February 2025.
This online vitriol manifests in dehumanizing language, blanket blaming of China for social problems, and even explicit calls for violence.
Comments such as “expel Chinese nationals; commit genocide if necessary” reflect how unchecked hostility can normalize dangerous rhetoric. Border controls and blockades imposed by China at checkpoints in northern Shan State have particularly inflamed tensions by restricting the movement of essential goods.
Myanmar’s citizens also link China to the military junta, viewing their cooperative relationship as a cynical disregard for human rights. Protesters in Lashio recently called on China to stop interfering in their affairs, specifically objecting to Chinese pressure on the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) to relinquish control of territory to the junta.5
The cumulative effect of these rejections threatens to derail China’s ambitious global economic strategy. Projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are increasingly viewed with suspicion rather than enthusiasm.
Countries that once welcomed Chinese investment as a counterweight to Western influence now question whether they’ve simply traded one form of economic dependency for another.
Chinese companies face a paradox: their competitive advantage often relies on state backing, yet this very connection makes them targets of national security concerns.
The blurred line between private enterprise and state interests in China’s economic model creates inherent vulnerabilities when operating abroad. Beijing’s diplomatic responses to these challenges have typically oscillated between indignation and economic coercion.
When faced with resistance, Chinese authorities often frame criticism as “interference in internal affairs” or threaten economic consequences. However, this approach has yielded diminishing returns as more countries prioritize security and sovereignty over economic incentives.
The mounting global resistance signals a fundamental reckoning for the Chinese business model abroad. The strategy of leveraging economic heft to gain political influence appears increasingly unsustainable as host nations assert greater control over their resources and infrastructure.
For Chinese companies, adaptation will require more than superficial changes.
Genuine transparency, equitable labor practices, environmental responsibility, and respect for local sovereignty must replace the extractive approach that has characterized many overseas ventures. Without such transformation, Chinese businesses will continue to face closed doors and hostile reception in an increasingly wary world.
As countries from Europe to Africa to Southeast Asia recalibrate their relationships with Chinese business interests, Beijing faces a stark choice: reform its approach to global commerce or watch its economic influence wane in the face of determined resistance.
The rejection rising against Chinese business expansion suggests that the era of uninhibited access to global markets may be coming to an end for the world’s second-largest economy.
